INTRODUCTION

Reasons for limiting judicial review

SECTION I

The judicial perspective

Justiciability
Legislative decisions
Polycentric decisions
Deference

SECTION II

The executive perspective

Considerations in the context of the Council’s first report
Other considerations in seeking to limit judicial review

SECTION III

The public perspective

INTRODUCTION

Reasons for limiting
judicial review

3.1
Policy considerations relevant to the scope of judicial review are
generally not neatly set out anywhere. Nor are they necessarily always
apparent through a process of logical deduction. For instance, where the
impact of an administrative decision upon the freedom of an individual might be
considered to be an important consideration in determining whether or not there should be a right of judicial review, the ‘end focus’ of judicial review is not
upon merits outcomes.

3.2
As noted earlier in the discussion paper, in reviewing administrative
action, the court’s task does not extend past identifying and enforcing the law
determinative of the limits and governing the exercise of the decision-maker’s
power.

3.3
It has been remarked by Brennan J in the case of Attorney-General
(NSW) v Quin that:

If, in so doing, the court avoids administrative injustice
or error, so be it: but the court has no jurisdiction simply to cure
administrative injustice or error. The merits of administrative action, to the
extent that they can be distinguished from legality, are for the repository of
the relevant power and, subject to political control, for the repository
alone.

The consequence is that the scope of judicial review must
be defined not in terms of the protection of individual interests, but in terms
of the extent of the power and the legality of its exercise.[1]

3.4
So it is that in the criminal, extradition and migration areas for
instance, all of them involving decisions concerning personal liberty, the
application of judicial review has been subject to statutory limitation.

3.5
As reflected in earlier discussion, it appears to be accepted by all
elements involved in Australia’s administrative law system (the executive, the
legislature and the judiciary), that in some circumstances, subject to
constitutional limitations, there should be limits on the scope of judicial
review.

3.6
In seeking to identify the relevant policy considerations underlying
this view, the Council will be looking at a range of materials, including what
has been said by courts and individual judges, administrators and commentators
(including the Council) in relation to the scope of judicial review under the
AD(JR) Act, other legislative regimes and at common law. In so doing, however,
it is not possible to dispense entirely with Constitutional considerations discussed
in Part II of the discussion paper.

SECTION I

The judicial perspective

3.7
There are at least four important areas in which the courts have imposed
limitations upon the scope of their own powers in response to the
Constitutional boundaries to judicial review. These limitations are often
articulated in terms of related, though less constitutionally directed
considerations, and represent a valuable tool in determining the desirable
scope of judicial review.

Justiciability

3.8
Nowadays, justiciability may best be categorised as a concept whose
purpose is to confine the courts to the exercise of judicial power in relation
to issues not properly assignable to other branches of government under the
separation of powers doctrine and otherwise ‘within the institutional
competence ‘ of the courts.[2] Conversely,
non-justiciability is a term that may conveniently be used to denote decisions
where the court is of the view that ‘the decision-making function lies within
the province of the executive and that it is inappropriate that the courts
should trespass into that preserve’.[3]

3.9
Historically, there is a range of decisions in which the courts have
long indicated a reluctance to intervene. Such decisions may be traced back to
the seventeenth century and the rules relating to the immunity of the Crown
from judicial review and for protecting the ‘unbounded discretion’ of the
King’s prerogatives. [4]

3.10       Recent
developments in the concept of justiciability have coincided with the
diminution of the prerogative powers,[5] and a corresponding
expansion of the range of executive powers exercised by officials. There has
been a related recognition that the doctrine of Crown immunity has less force
in relation to executive action. This is reflected in R vToohey: ex parte Northern
Land Council, where it was noted that an exercise of
statutory discretionary power by the Queen’s representative ‘very often affects
the right of the citizen’[6] and:

…there may be a duty to exercise the discretion one way or
another; the discretion may be precisely limited in scope; it may be conferred
for a specific or an ascertainable purpose; and it will be exercisable by
reference to criteria or considerations express or implied.[7]

3.11       In
the wake of Toohey it has been said that:

…[the] function associated with Crown immunity [has been]
banished from administrative law. The assumption that questions of justiciability
could be answered on the basis of simple distinctions between statutory powers
and prerogative powers, or between the status of the Queens’ representative
and that of a minister, [has been] exploded.[8]

3.12       Nonetheless,
it is suggested that the concept of justiciability remains an important element
of our administrative law system.

3.13       In
determining whether or not a decision is justiciable, the nature and effect of
the decision have emerged as critical factors. Two elements are involved:

·
whether the decision has consequences which affect some person or
body other than the decision-maker by either:

Ø      altering
legal rights or obligations enforceable by or against a person; or

Ø      depriving
a person of some benefits which they had in the past and which they can
legitimately expect to continue or where an assurance has been given by the
decision-maker that the right will not be withdrawn, or depriving a person of
some benefit or advantage or body other than the decision-maker; and

·
whether there are special features of the decision which make
judicial review inappropriate[9] such as issues of high
level policy, polycentricity,[10] and decisions of a
legislative nature (discussed above).

3.14       The
foundation for justiciability was discussed by Kirby J:

Th[e] foundation [of justiciability] lies in the separation
of powers required by the Constitution. Is the question tendered, of its
nature, such as is apt to a court performing court-like functions? If it is
not, it matters little in practical terms whether the court, facing an
objection, rules that it lacks jurisdiction for want of a “matter”
engaging its powers, or that it says that any such “matter” would be
non-justiciable. In either event, the court’s duty is plain. It should stop the
proceedings forthwith. It will thereby send the parties to the other branches
of government, or to other public fora, in which they can make their complaint.[11]

3.15       With
reference to these considerations, although some decisions are no longer immune
from judicial review on the basis of prerogative, they are still treated with
caution by the courts. Decisions affecting national security, foreign affairs,
decisions to prosecute or not to prosecute and the grant of pardons to
convicted persons are amongst such decisions. However, it is not sufficient to
seek to identify cases that are non-justiciable on the basis of subject matter
alone.[12]

3.16       The
grant of executive power under the constitution necessarily entails the
imposition of enforceable limitations on the exercise of that power.[13]
Although non-justiciability may exclude certain aspects of judicial review, it
may not exclude others. Some aspects of decisions relating to international
relations, national security and even politics, may be justiciable.[14]
Irrespective of subject matter, decisions will be subject to judicial review if
they are illegal or ultra vires.[15]

3.17       Regard
may also be had to the nature of the decision under review, including the way
it is arrived at, rather than the general subject area. In one case for
example, where a decision to remove someone’s positive security vetting due to
sexual preference was based on national security considerations and was not
reviewable on substantive grounds, it was held that the decision was reviewable
for breach of procedural fairness.[16]

3.18       At
its broadest, justiciability has been said to cover matters such as ‘the
availability of alternative and more convenient remedies, political questions,
questions concerning the distribution of scarce resources and future rights’.[17]

3.19       Justiciability
in the broad sense is what a significant portion of this discussion paper is
about.

Legislative decisions

3.20       In
Part II of the discussion paper, ‘The significance and constitutional scope of
judicial review’, broad constitutional limits on the exercise of judicial
review have been canvassed. Arising from one of these limitations, the
doctrine of the separation of powers, is the accepted categorisation of
government functions as legislative, administrative and judicial.

3.21       Although
decisions are rarely held to be invalid on the basis of these distinctions,
apart from those reflecting an exercise of judicial power, the legislative or
administrative character of a decision has been an aspect which both the courts
and government have taken into account in determining which has pre-eminence.

3.22       The
distinction is highlighted in the AD(JR) Act, which is limited in its
application to ‘administrative decisions’.[18] However, it has lost
much of its significance as a result of the inclusion in the Judiciary Act of
section 39B(1A)(c), which confers jurisdiction on the Federal Court in matters
‘arising under any law made by Parliament’.[19]

3.23       Recent
case-law seeks to address the issue of whether or not a decision is
‘legislative’ in terms of whether or not the rights of particular individuals
are affected. In Kioa v West for instance, three of the majority judges
emphasised the need for persons to be affected ‘as individuals’ if natural justice
is to apply.[20]

3.24       This
topic is explored in more detail in Section III of Part V of the discussion
paper, ‘Nature of the decision’.

Polycentric decisions

3.25       It
has been said that:

The notion of legal polycentricity…is best understood as
referring to matters which are marked by the numerous, complex and intertwined
nature of the issues, of the repercussions, and of the interests and people
affected. For example, any decision requiring the allocation of economic
resources is significantly polycentric, as every competing claim on government
resources is a relevant factor.[21]

3.26       A
polycentric decision may therefore be a decision involving complex policy
issues relating to the economic, political and social consequences of a
proposed mining project, as occurred in Minister for Arts, Heritage and
Environment v Peko Wallsend.[22] A result is that the
case may not be appropriate for judicial review.

3.27       A polycentric
decision may also be one where the limited nature of available government
funding will constantly mean that the government will have to balance its
priorities. There is authority for the view that the courts may intervene
in such circumstances where an allocation of resources is beyond power or
‘capricious and irrational such that no reasonable person could have devised
it’: however, the courts should not intervene to devise a fairer method of
allocation.[23]

3.28       Case
law indicates that the courts will retreat from review that will have an impact
on the allocation of resources. As noted by one British judge:

I would stress the absolute undesirability of the court
making an order which may have the effect of compelling a doctor or health
authority to make available scarce resources (both human and material) to a
particular child, without knowing whether or not there are other patients to
whom those resources might more advantageously be devoted.[24]

3.29       On
one view, polycentric disputes are inappropriate for judicial resolution on the
basis that not all affected parties may be identifiable or able to be brought
before the court and that there may be too many possible permutations of
results for the parties and judges to be able to provide reasons for the making
of a decision.[25] However, it has also
been observed that:

All judicial decisions are polycentric to the extent that they
have precedential value and those decisions cover interests and matters not
directly before the court.[26]

3.30       It
is noted[27] that the Canadian
Supreme Court is willing to permit the intervention of affected parties,[28]
whilst the US Supreme Court has long permitted written submissions from
interested parties as amici curiae.[29] In Australian cases such
as Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority[30]
involving a challenge to the validity of Australian Broadcasting Authority
standards regulations, a tendency in this regard is noted, although whether it
will crystallise remains uncertain.[31]

3.31       It
has been said that:

…neither polycentricity in particular, nor capability in general,
is a valid per se objection to judicial review of constitutional rights.
However, they may be factors supporting judicial restraint in particular cases,
and they may require extensions of traditional procedures relating to evidence
and the representation of wider interests.[32]

3.32       Although
unlikely to be reviewable generally, such decisions would nonetheless be
reviewable for ultra vires. Further, it has been observed with
reference to the Tampa case[33] that ‘the courts must be
satisfied that a matter is non-justiciable before they decline to deal with the
matter’.[34]

 

3.33       In
that case, it was noted that:

 

It is not an interference with the exercise of executive
power to determine whether it exists in relation to the subject matter to which
it is applied and whether what is done is within its scope. Even in the United
Kingdom, unencumbered by a written constitution, the threshold question
whether an act is done under prerogative power is justiciable.[35]

Deference

3.34       The
role of the courts with respect to judicial review may be limited if there is a
principle of deference applied.

3.35       The
focus of deference in Australia is primarily upon findings of fact and verbal
slips in statements of reasons and is to be contrasted with the focus of the United
States Chevron doctrine[36] and to an extent, the
Canadian public interest standard,[37] on agency interpretation
of legislation. Contrary to the position in those two countries, in Corporation
of the City of Enfield v Development Assessment Commission,
the High Court has emphasised that the approach is not:

…the product of any doctrine of ‘deference’, but of basic principles
of administrative law respecting the exercise of discretionary powers. [38]

 

3.36       In
support of this view, the Court adverted to the distinction between the merits
and the legality of administrative action, and to comments of Brennan J in Waterford
v Commonwealth[39] to the effect that
‘there is no error of law simply in making a wrong finding of fact.’

3.37       However,
where the legality of executive administrative action taken pursuant to a
decision depends on the existence of a particular fact or factual situation,
and the question is whether the tribunal acted within jurisdiction, their
Honours held that the court must make its own independent determination. This
obligation would arise notwithstanding the fact that the court might attach
greater weight to the decision of a primary decision-maker with particular
knowledge of an industry or otherwise specially equipped to make the decision.[40]

3.38       The
Court acknowledged however that while it must come to its own answer on the
question of jurisdiction, if in so doing it were in doubt as to any factual
matter, it would be open to it ‘to resolve that doubt by giving weight to any
determination upon it by the primary decision-maker.[41]

3.39       The
doctrine is also relevant to certain decisions made within jurisdiction. In Enfield,[42]
the High Court has said that where questions arise, within the jurisdiction of
an administrative tribunal, upon a settled construction of the applicable
legislation and where little might be gained from a detailed examination of
previous decisions, in a proceeding in the original jurisdiction of a court on
“appeal” from that tribunal, the ‘court should attach great weight to
the opinion of the [tribunal]’.

3.40       Reference
is made to a case[43] where the court
said that it ‘should attach great weight to the opinion of the tribunal’ in
considering whether a proposed trade mark was distinctive and ought to have
been registered.[44] The Court also noted[45]
approval by Dixon CJ, Williams and Kitto JJ in another case[46]
of a passage from a judgment of Lloyd-Jacob J stating that:

By reason of his familiarity with trade usages in this
country, a familiarity which stems not only from an examination of marks
applied for and of the many trade journals which he sees, but from the perusal
and consideration of trade declarations and the hearing of applications or
oppositions, the Registrar is peculiarly well fitted to assess the standards by
which the trade and public must be expected to estimate the uniqueness of
particular indications of trade origin.[47]

3.41       As
noted by Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ,[48]
the weight to be given to the opinion of the tribunal in each case will depend
on the circumstances. According to their Honours, such matters as the field in
which the tribunal operates, criteria for appointment of its members, the
materials on which it acts in exercising its functions and the extent to which
decisions are supported by disclosed processes of reasoning, would be relevant
considerations.

3.42       Where
the question is whether the tribunal acted within jurisdiction, the court must
make its own independent determination, although it may attach greater weight
to the decision of a primary decision-maker with particular knowledge of an
industry or otherwise specially equipped to make the decision.[49]

3.43       This
approach may also influence the shape of the obligations to be assumed by
decision-makers in relation to the grounds of review, notably, procedural
fairness. In Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Jia for
example, Hayne J said as follows:

The procedures for decision-making by that body [the
Refugee Review Tribunal] are much less formal than those of a court. There is
no provision for any contradictor and the procedures are, therefore, not
adversarial. The decision-maker has little security of tenure and, at least to
that extent, may be thought to have some real stake in the outcome. The
decision-maker, in a body like the Refugee Review Tribunal, will bring to the
task of deciding an individual’s application a great deal of information and
ideas which have been accumulated or formed in the course of deciding other
applications. A body like the Refugee Review Tribunal, unlike a court, is
expected to build up “expertise” in matters such as country
information. Often information of that kind is critical in deciding the fate of
an individual’s application, but it is not suggested that to take it into
account amounts to a want of procedural fairness by reason of prejudgment.

The analogy with curial processes becomes even less
apposite as the nature of the decision-making process, and the identity of the
decision-maker, diverges further from the judicial paradigm. It is trite to say
that the content of the rules of procedural fairness must be “appropriate
and adapted to the circumstances of the particular case”. What is appropriate
when a decision of a disputed question is committed to a tribunal whose
statutorily defined processes have some or all of the features of a court will
differ from what is appropriate when the decision is committed to an
investigating body. Ministerial decision-making is different again.[50]

Discussion point 2

3.44       These
cases suggest a degree of deference to the inherent knowledge or expertise of
the original decision-maker or tribunal on the part of the court. This
inherent knowledge or expertise may also be relevant to the shape of the
obligations of the decision-maker on issues of procedural fairness.

3.45       However,
it is another thing altogether to suggest that that the expertise or inherent
knowledge of the decision-maker (or the tribunal) is such as to form the basis
for excluding judicial review; the adversarial process has the capacity to
allow supplementation of the technical inadequacies of the courts.

Are there other factors relevant to the judicial perspective in seeking to define the desirable scope of judicial review? Please elaborate.

SECTION II

The executive perspective

3.46       The
most comprehensive indication of the executive view of the desirable scope of
judicial review (at least for the purposes of the AD(JR) Act), occurred in the
late 1970s when, at the request of the government, exclusions from the
application of that Act sought by agencies were under consideration by the
Council.

Considerations raised in
the context of the Council’s first report

3.47       The
Council’s first report, Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977:
Exclusions under Section 19, – 1978, sets out a range of arguments for and
against the exclusion of various sorts of decisions from review under the
AD(JR) Act.

3.48       In
the report, the Council rejected arguments by government agencies for the
exclusion of judicial review on the basis of the following considerations:

·
the high number of decisions likely to be brought forward for
review[51]

·
decisions involving large elements of policy[52]

·
the existence of adequate alternative remedies[53]

·
the urgency of the decision[54]

·
that the decision was made by an inter-governmental authority[55]

·
that the powers were exercised by State officials[56]

·
that the decision was made by a consultative or an advisory
authority or authority not dealing directly with the public[57]

·
in general, that the Act would be used to frustrate and delay the
administrative process

·
that the decision was a general management determination under
the Public Service Act (such as decisions as to age limits, appropriate
qualifications and the creation, abolition and classification of positions)[58]

·
decisions in the Public Service employment area (including
decisions relating to recruitment and appointment, discipline, re-integration
and appointment of First Division and Statutory officers) other than promotions
and promotion appeals which were recommended for exclusion for 12 months from
the date of commencement of the AD(JR) Act)[59]

·
the difficulty in producing reasons[60]

·
the possibility of parliamentary disallowance[61]

·
the status of the decision-maker and the person subject to the
decision[62]

·
absence of review by the Administrative Appeals
Tribunal/exclusion from the application of the Ombudsman Act 1976[63]

·
potential abuse of right to review;[64]and

·
that non-citizens should not be able to get the rights and privileges
of the Act;[65]

3.49       The
Council was divided as to the application of the AD(JR) Act to commercially
competitive statutory authorities, recommending by a narrow majority against
exemption.[66]

3.50       The
Council also recommended that the following decisions be excluded from the
operation of the AD(JR) Act:

·
decisions relating to the administration of justice[67]

·
decisions of the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission (on the
basis, in part, of the historical development of the role of the High Court in
judicial review of decisions of the Commission and analogous bodies)[68]

·
decisions of the Commonwealth Grants Commission relating to the
granting of funds relating to the allocation of funds[69]

·
decisions made by ASIO under the Australian Security and
Intelligence Organisation Act and the Telephonic Interception Act (on the basis
that such decisions related to national security. In the case of ASIO
employment decisions, review was not considered appropriate)[70]

·
decisions relating to armed forces discipline (on the basis of
the detrimental effect on the command relationship which is important in the
operations of a disciplined force)[71]

·
certain decisions to withdraw monies in accordance with
government appropriations (on the basis that such decisions related to internal
financial arrangements made within government)[72]

·
various foreign affairs decisions (on the basis that those
decisions relate to Australia’s relations with foreign countries and
international organisations)[73]

·
decisions of the Advisory Council for Inter-Governmental Relations
(on the basis that it dealt only with the relationships inter se the
organs of government – if necessary, such an organisation should only be
subject to judicial review in the High Court, which stands at the apex of both
Commonwealth and State judicial systems)[74]

·
decisions relating to tax assessment (on the basis of the
existence of a long established and well developed system of judicial review of
taxation decisions, involving State and Territory Supreme Courts [although not
with respect to Sales Tax] the Federal Court [with respect to income tax only]
and ultimately the High Court, in the appellate structure. It was noted that
‘[t]hese courts have power to substitute their assessment for that of the
Commissioner, which is not a power available to the Federal Court under the
[AD(JR] Act’. The Council also noted that ‘[u]nder the existing law, tax
becomes payable immediately upon the issue of the assessment and the obligation
to pay is not deferred pending appeal. Accordingly, there could be strong incentive
to challenge the validity of the assessment under the Act, thereby
circumventing the existing appellate processes and possibly deferring payment
of the tax.’);[75]and

·
certain migration decisions relating to diplomatic and consular
representatives (as such decisions were made on the basis of foreign relations
considerations).[76]

Other considerations in
seeking to limit judicial review

3.51       More
recently, amendments to the Migration Act by the Migration Reform Act 1992,
the Migration (Judicial Review) Act 2001 and the Migration
Legislation Amendment (Procedural Fairness) Act 2002 have heightened
discussion, from both a constitutional and a policy perspective, on the
desirable scope of judicial review. Arguments raised for limiting the scope of
judicial review in the context of amendments to the Migration Act have
included:

·
abuse of process;

·
the high volume of applications;

·
the need for consistency; and

·
cost.

3.52       As
emphasised in Part I of the discussion paper, many enactments and
decision-making schemes reflect a desire on the part of the government to limit
judicial review. However, in many instances, extrinsic evidence associated
with these enactments (including the Schedule 1 amendment to the AD(JR) Act),
provides little indication of the reasons for such limitations.

3.53       In
the taxation area, the existence of alternate remedies appears to have been an
important consideration. In the explanatory memorandum to the Administrative
Decisions (Judicial Review) Amendment Bill 1980 it is said that:

The purpose of this exclusion [of decisions affecting the
assessment or calculation of taxation, including customs and excise duties] is
to leave these matters subject only to the ordinary procedures for review or
appeal provided in the relevant legislation under which the tax or duty is
assessed or calculated, and to prevent these procedures being short circuited
by application to the Federal Court for judicial review.

3.54       In
its submission in response to draft Council report 32,[77]
the Australian Taxation Office said that:

Recourse to the AD(JR) Act is of limited benefit to a
taxpayer genuinely seeking review of an assessment as the Federal Court may
only consider whether a decision is made according to law and cannot review the
merits of a decision. If review were available under the AD(JR) Act this would
undoubtedly be used to delay and frustrate the assessment process and to
explore the information the Commissioner possessed in relation to the
taxpayer. Perhaps of fundamental importance…to allow review of decisions
affecting assessments would radically disturb the onus of proof which, as an
integral part of the taxation system, quite properly lies with the payer. It is
the taxpayer, not the Commissioner, who is best aware of the taxpayer’s own
affairs.[78]

3.55       The
‘conclusive evidence’ provision in section 177 of the Income Tax Assessment
Act 1936 reflects a desire to limit and streamline the assessment and
review process. By stating that the production of a notice of assessment is
conclusive evidence of its existence, the legislation seeks to avoid litigation
by taxpayers delaying the assessment process by requiring the Commissioner in
each case to prove the validity of the assessment or justifying the process
under which the assessment was raised. The policy underlying section 177 is to
promote efficient tax administration by restricting appeals against assessments
to the specialist tax law appeal processes.[79]

3.56       In
its 32^nd report, the Council also notes as a reason for the
inclusion of paragraphs (e) and (g) (decisions relating to taxation assessment
and calculation and decisions under the Taxation Administration Act 1953)[80]
in Schedule 1 to the AD(JR) Act, the long established and well developed system
for appeals against taxation decisions.[81] In its first report, Administrative
Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977, Exclusions under section 19, – 1978,
the Council also paid cognisance to ‘the historical development of the role of
the High Court in judicial review of decisions of the [then, Conciliation and
Arbitration] Commission and analogous bodies’.[82] Any potential to delay
the collection of revenue would also be of significance.

 

3.57       Similarly
with the Jurisdiction of Courts (Legislation Amendment) Act 2000 in
relation to exemption from the application of the AD(JR) Act of certain decisions
in the criminal justice area. There too, related arguments were raised in
relation to abuse of process, frustration of the criminal justice system and
prolongation of the criminal justice system.

3.58       Other
restrictions on judicial review, such as those relating to the validity of
appointments, though unstated, would also seem to arise from concerns for the
efficacy of the administrative system as a whole, concerns apparently
considered in those cases to outweigh the benefits of judicial review for the individual.
Similar considerations emerge in the area of workplace relations and public
sector employment, where there is a strong emphasis on harmonious working
relationships and effective dispute resolution. This is a particularly
important consideration where people may have to continue to work along-side
each other.

 

3.59       Regulation
5.1 of the Public Service Regulations 1999 which contains a statement of
general policy concerning review of actions, indicating that it is the policy
of the Australian Government that Australian Public Service Agencies should
achieve and maintain workplaces that encourage productive and harmonious
working environments. The intention of Part 5 is said to be to provide for a
fair system of review of APS actions and it is noted that nothing in Part 5 is
intended to prevent an application for review from being resolved by
conciliation or other means at any time before the review process is completed.

 

Discussion point 3

Are there other factors relevant to the executive perspective in seeking to define the desirable scope of judicial review? Please elaborate.

SECTION III

The public perspective

3.60       In
seeking to determine the appropriate scope of judicial review in given
situations, it is not only the views and interests of the courts and the
executive that need to be taken into account. The best interests of the
general public need always to be taken into consideration.

3.61       The
concept of administrative justice is relevant to any such consideration,
holding, as it does, implications for both the quality and the procedural
standards adopted in the making of a decision.

3.62       Elements
such as:

·
lawfulness

·
rationality; and

·
fairness

have been said to be relevant to the quality of the
decision, while concepts of:

·
accessibility

·
affordability

·
cost to the general public[83]

·
timeliness;[84] and

·
discernible reasons for the decision[85]

have been said to be relevant to the procedural side of
administrative justice.[86]

3.63       As
stated elsewhere in this discussion paper, while encompassing consideration of
questions of lawfulness, procedural fairness, and in extreme situations, the
rationality of a decision, judicial review does not provide for the
substitution of one administrative decision for another.

3.64       The
court has no jurisdiction simply to cure administrative injustice or error. It
has therefore been observed that ‘the extent of the support able to be given by
judicial review processes to administrative justice is considerably
circumscribed’.[87]

3.65       Additionally,
there is a tension between judicial review and considerations of cost,
timeliness and accessibility, all of which are desirable from the point of view
of the individual applicant and the general community.

3.66       Judicial
review is often more expensive for the parties challenging a decision than
merits review, and it is arguable that an external review on the merits will
achieve the same outcome and result not only in the setting aside of the
decision but the making of the correct or preferable decision in its place.

3.67       It
has been said in this respect that:

(I)t is often good policy to commit certain primary
decision-making, and the grievance procedures in relation to those primary
decisions, to a relatively judge-proof environment. Questions of accessibility
(including cost, effectiveness and efficiency) must be relevant to the

design of relationships between bodies within a regulatory
structure and to their individual and overall relationship in the courts.[88]

3.68       It
has also been said that a decision-making system that:

…guarantees ultimate correctness or accuracy in decision-making
is likely to run counter to these desirable essentials of the decision-making
process. Detailed fact finding, careful balancing of issues,… will be slow.
Some persons affected by government decisions can afford to have this occur but
they will be few in number.[89]

3.69       In
response to such arguments it may be countered that there are significant
rights going to the scope of decision-making power and the manner in which it
is exercised recognised in the grounds of judicial review, which are not fully
replicated in the merits review process.

3.70       As
noted in Part II of the discussion paper, ‘The Significance and Constitutional
Scope of Judicial Review’, judicial review is an essential element of the rule
of law and a significant aid to executive accountability, consistency and
precedent. All these things are of ultimate benefit to members of the public
who experience administrative decision-making.

Discussion point 4

Are there other factors relevant to the public perspective in seeking to define the desirable scope of judicial review? Please elaborate.